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FIRST AMENDMENT

Federal Funds To Religious Groups:
Where Are The First AmendmentBoundaries?
By Neal Devins

Otis R. Bowen

v.
Chan Kendrick

(Docket Nos. 87·253, 87·431,87462 and 87·775)
Argued March 30, 1988
Bowen v. Kendrick promises to be one of this tenn's most
controversial decisions. The conjunction of church state
concerns and governmental efforts to Influence adolescent
sexual relations Is explosive. The Court has previously con·
sldered the constitutionality of religious groups' support of
Congress' decision to deny federal funding of abortion
(Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)), upholding the
constitutionality of the Hyde antiabortion amendment. How·
ever, It has never considered the propriety of church-affillat·
ed organizations utJllzing federal funds In discouraging
abortions through counseling against premarital sexual rela·
tlons as well as advising pregnant minors of adoption and
referral services. Here, the Court will consider this highly
emotional issue.
ISSUE

In this case, the Supreme Court will tackle the vexing
issue of federal government assistance to religious social
service organizations. Specifically, the Court will detennlne
whether the Adolescent Family Ufe Act, which authorizes
federal funding to religious organizations to conduct pro·
grams on adolescent sexuality Issue::, violates the Establish·
ment Clause of the First Amendment.
FACI'S

Congress passed the Adolescent Family Life Act (42
U.S.C. section 3000 In 1981to replace the Adolescent Health
Services and Pregnancy Care Act of 1978. The purpose of this
Act Is to prevent adolescent pregnancy. To achieve this end,
the Act authorizes federal funds be granted to organizations
to conduct care and prevention service programs. To rectify
the lack of values taught In Title VI programs, Congress
chose to Include religious organizations In programs under
the Act. Specifically, the Act requires applicants to describe
how they will Involve religious organizations in their pro·
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grams and limits funding to programs which do not provide
abortions or abortion services.
An actlon seeking declaratory and Injunctive relief was
filed on October 26, 1983 In the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia by several individuals Including
federal taxpayers, four Protestant ministers and the American
jewish Congress. They challenged the Act on the ground
that It violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
The district court found that the Adolescent Family Ufe
Act violates the Establishment Clause both on Its face and as
applied. The district court also concluded that portions of
the Act Involving religious organizations were severable
from the Act as a whole (657 E. Supp. 1547 (1987)). In
reaching this conclusion, the court applied the three·part test
set forth In Lemon v. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
Under this test, a court must detennlne whether the legisla·
tlon: has a valid secular purpose; it does not have the primary
effect of advancing religion; and It does not cause excessive
entanglements between the government and religion. Fail·
ure to meet any part of this tripartite test renders the legisla·
tion Invalid. The district court found that the Act had the
valid secular purpose of attempting to prevent teenage
pregnancy, but failed the "primary effect" and "excessive
entanglement" prongs of the test.
The district court found that the Act had the primary effect
of advancing religion, In part, because It feared that one· tO·
one counseling might be a mechanism for religious teach·
ing. In particular, the district court was concerned that
adolescents suffering from the stress of pregnancy would be
especially vulnerable and susceptible to rellgious indoctrina·
tlon. The court concluded that the Act presents Issues
analogous to state aid to elementary and seconduy parochial
schools. In these cases, the Supreme Court-claiming that
such schools are "pervasively religious"-has been reluctant
to validate governmental assistance programs.
The Act was also found to have violated the "excessive
entanglement" prong of the Lemon test. The district court
concluded that-since the counseling services carried an
Inherent risk that religion would be promoted-extensive
and continuous monitoring by government would be re·
qulred to ensure against such promot10n. The governmentclaiming that grantee religious organizations are not per·
vasivel}' sectarian-argues that this case does not raise "ex·
cesslve entanglement" concerns.
Finally, the district court found that the portions of the Act
Involving religious organizations were severable from the
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rest of the Act. The court therefore enjoined all funding of
religious organizations under the Adolescent Family Ufe Act.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the taxpayers argue that
It Is lmpennlsslble for Congress to propagate religion as It
does in the Act. Specifically, they contend that the counseling services provided in Act programs are not neutral social
services-arguing that It Is virtually Impossible to separate
secular from religious values when counseling on matters
central to religious beliefs. Finally, the taxpayers, noting that
the Act's goals are more consistent with some religious
beliefs than others....-contend that It Is Impermissible to use
federal funding to favor one set of religious beliefs over
another.
The United States, on the other hand, argues that It is
permissible to legislate religious values and provide funding
for religious organizations if they are performing neutral
social services. The government further claims that the Act is
part of such a program both because counseling services are
secular and because its grantees are Informed that federal
funds may not be used to Inculcate religion. Finally, the
government contends that the Establishment Clause does
not prohibit neutral federal legislation from disproportion·
ately benefiting certain religious organizations.
The United States argues that the Act's programs are
analogous to government aid to religiously affiliated hospl·
tals (where the Court nearly a century ago upheld such
programs) because neutral social services are at issue. In
making this argument, the United States emphasizes that
religious organizations are particularly equipped to promote
neutral social services; since over time they have developed
extensive mechanisms for delivering social services to the
community, such as adoption services and homeless shelters. The government therefore urges that counselors in the
programs Involved here could effectively set aside their
religious beliefs and Impart secular values to their clients.
Bowen v. Kendrick stands at the crossroads of two politically irreconcilable doctrines. At one end, Roe v. Wade and
its progeny hold Inviolable a pregnant woman's choice
(Including that of mature minors) to have an abortion. At the
other end, Harris v. McRae holds that the government Is not
obligated to fund the exercise of that choice. The case now
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before the Court asks whether church social services can
serve as a governmentally sponsored wedge between the two
leanings.
If the Court here strikes down the Act, the case could
severely limit cooperative efforts between government and
religion In other areas. As noted In the government's brief,
religious organizations have participated In a variety of gov·
ernmental-funded programs Including hospitals, soup kltch·
ens, drug abuse programs, orphanages, emergency shelters,
Head Start and mental health programs. The invalidation of
the Act would certainly portend problems for church·affiliat·
ed social services which Involve counseling. On the other
hand, If the Act Is validated, It Is likely that religious organfza.
tlons will seek greater governmental assistance for their
social service programs.
ARGUMENTS
For Chan Kendrldl (Counsel ofRecord, Bruce Ennis, 1200

17/h Streel, NW, Washington, DC 20036; telephone (202)
775·8100)

The Act violates the effects and entanglement prongs of
the Lemon test.
2. The Act's provisions concerning religious organizations
cannot be severed from the entire Act. Therefore, the
entire statute must fall.
1.

For Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Heallb and Hunum
Services (Cormse4 Charles Fried, Department of justice,
Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202) 633·2217)

1. The Act does not violate the Establishment Clause since it

has a secular legislative purpose, does not advance or
Inhibit religion and does not foster excessive entangle·
mentwith religion.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support ofChan Kendrldl

Planned Parenthood; American Psychological Associa·
tion; NOW; the American Jewish Committee
In Support ofOils R. Bowen

The U.S. catholic Conference; the Catholic League for
Religious and Civil Rights; United Families of America
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